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Abstract: Lovering and colleagues attempt to advance understanding of construction cost escalation 
risks inherent in building nuclear reactors and power plants, a laudable goal. Although we appreciate 
their focus on capital cost increases and overruns, we maintain in this critical appraisal that their study 
conceptualizes cost issues in a limiting way. Methodological choices in treating different cost categories 
by the authors mean that their conclusions are more narrowly applicable than they describe. We also 
argue that their study is factually incorrect in its criticism of the previous peer-reviewed literature. 
Earlier work, for instance, has compared historical construction costs for nuclear reactors with other 
energy sources, in many countries, and extending over several decades. Lastly, in failing to be 
transparent about the limitations of their own work, Lovering et al. have recourse to a selective choice 
of data, unbalanced analysis, and biased interpretation. 
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Cost Overruns and Financial Risk in the Construction of Nuclear Power Reactors: A Critical Appraisal  
It is a capital mistake to theorize before one has data.  Insensibly one begins to twist facts to suite 
theories, instead of theories to suite facts. 
Sherlock Holmes, in Arthur Conan Doyle͛s A Scandal in Bohemia, 1891, p. 78.  
Introduction  
Despite sounding a bit dry, there can be little doubt that the topic of construction cost overruns 
is of central importance to energy and electricity planning, investment, policy, and regulation.  As Bacon 
and Besant-Jones wrote (1998, p. 317) in the present journal almost two decades ago: 
The economic impact of a construction cost overrun is the possible loss of the economic 
justification for the project.  A cost overrun can also be critical to policies for pricing electricity 
on the basis of economic costs, because such overruns would lead to underpricing.  The financial 
impact of a cost overrun is the strain on the power utility and on national financing capacity in 
terms of foreign borrowings and domestic credit.   
In other words, evaluations of construction cost escalation and overruns have much to tell regarding 
inefficiencies in the allocation of resources, and can assist with estimating likelihoods of future 
infrastructure risks.    
It is in this regard that we appreciate and understand the interest in this topic shown by 
Lovering, Yip, and Nordhaus (2016a), in their effort at analysing new global data on overnight nuclear 
construction costs.  However, we disagree with their conclusion that there is ͞Ŷo iŶhereŶt Đost 
escalation trend associated nuclear technology.͟    
In this response, we critique Lovering et al. on three grounds.  First, we argue that a series of 
methodological choices undermine their conclusions and limit the applicability of their results in respect 
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of both historical and future nuclear construction costs.  Second, we question the reliability of the data 
underlying Lovering et. al. by discussing three recent studies that are global in scope and focus on trends 
from the past few decades of nuclear construction.  Third, we express concerns that recent public 
declarations made by the authors when discussing their article are not based on their actual data or on 
reliable results.  The first criticism refutes the pieĐe͛s methodology; the second questions its 
comparative novelty; the third challenges the objectivity of the overall framing and interpretation.   
Worrying methodological assumptions  
Our first criticism is that the narrow definition of construction costs used by Lovering et. al. 
(2016a), overnight capital costs (OCC), is not an appropriate metric to judge nuclear construction costs. 
This cost is notionally what it would take to build a reactor ͞overnight͟, ǁith financing and other time-
related costs omitted. We raise three issues with this methodology:  
 OCC are an inappropriate measure of power plant construction costs 
 OCC aŶd the author͛s defiŶitioŶ of Đost esĐalatioŶ do Ŷot iŶĐlude the full iŵpaĐts of Đost 
overruns 
 Even if OCC was an appropriate metric, Lovering et. al. do not normalize them in a way that 
supports the studǇ͛s ĐoŶĐlusioŶs regardiŶg iŶtriŶsiĐ teĐhŶologǇ Đosts 
First, Lovering et. al. specifically exclude interest costs on the basis that they "are more predictable 
and have had far less variatioŶ oǀer tiŵe aŶd ĐouŶtrǇ͟ aŶd ďeĐause the authors ǁaŶt ͞to Đapture the 
Đost iŶtriŶsiĐ to the reaĐtor teĐhŶologǇ.͟  However, this contradicts subsequent statements in the study. 
The study notes that interest costs do have a significant effect on total direct costs for a nuclear plant, 
comprising an average of 46% of the total upfront cost of a US nuclear reactor. Moreover, the share of 
interest in overall construction costs varies considerably. The study notes that interest costs could 
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comprise 12-54% of total upfront costs of a nuclear plant with reasonable cost of capital and 
construction time assumptions. 
This contradictory stance indicates a major methodological limitation: excluding interest costs 
means the findings of this study are not a realistic picture of the costs of building a nuclear power plant, 
as the authors assert iŶ their ĐoŶĐlusioŶ. ‘ather their data oŶlǇ eǆaŵiŶes part of a ŶuĐlear poǁer plaŶt͛s 
overall construction costs.  No power plant can be built overnight. This is especially true for nuclear 
plants, which have some of the longest lead times of any power infrastructure (Sovacool et. al. 2014c). 
Long construction times and high financing costs are not just incidental, but intrinsic features of the 
nuclear option. Any nuclear developer must include the cost of financing in the calculation of overall 
construction costs. The academic literature has long recognized that narrowing the scope to only 
overnight costs paints a misleading picture of the full costs of a nuclear power plant (Marshall and 
Navarro 1991, Koomey and Hultman 2007). 
Second, the authors do not address time and cost overruns in calculating capital costs or cost 
escalation for nuclear technology, despite their central role. This is elided by the unfortunate way in 
which established literatures tend to use the terŵ ͞Đost esĐalatioŶ͟ iŶ tǁo ǁaǇs ǁheŶ it Đoŵes to 
nuclear construction economics: 
 First, to describe how aggregate nuclear capital costs have increased over time (Grubler 2010, 
Koomey and Hultman 2007); 
 Second, to describe how the costs for an individual nuclear reactor climb during construction 
due to cost overruns (Sovacool et. al., 2014a,b,c). 
When Lovering et. al. suggest ͞there is Ŷo iŶhereŶt Đost esĐalatioŶ treŶd assoĐiated ǁith ŶuĐlear 
teĐhŶologǇ͟, theǇ foĐus on the first definition of cost escalation. However, when calculating general 
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historical costs for nuclear reactors, the second definition relating to cost overruns is just as important 
from a policy perspective and much more important from a financing perspective. 
Our own work on the role of cost overruns in nuclear economics yields several points that 
deserve highlighting.  First, almost all nuclear reactors suffer from cost overruns.  Second, nuclear cost 
overruns occur in all countries.  Third, cost overruns are much greater for nuclear than for other energy 
sources.  Fourth, nuclear cost overruns are heavily influenced by interest costs and time overruns 
(Sovacool et. al., 2014a,b,c).  Lovering, et. al. do not challenge this picture from the existing literature. 
Indeed, by failing to address the roles of interest costs or construction delays, their study effectively 
ignores some of the most important issues in understanding historical nuclear construction cost trends. 
Third, while Lovering et. al. provide value from compiling comparative OCC figures, their 
conclusions regarding the meaning these figures are limited by a lack of normalized. Overnight capital 
costs iŶ the studǇ͛s sample are not normalized for input costs, such as labor, commodity costs, exchange 
rates, and interest rates. These factors impact both total capital costs and cost overruns for individual 
power projects (Sovacool et. al. 2014 a,b,c). Yet Lovering et. al. only briefly acknowledge the role these 
factors play in nuclear reactor costs and do not examine how they influence reported overnight capital 
cost outcomes across their sample. 
Admittedly, controlling for these factors may be difficult – they vary significantly both over time 
and by location. However, if the goal is to assess cost trends for a specific reactor technology (as 
Lovering et. al. aim to do), then assessing these factors is absolutely essential in order properly to 
account for technological learning over time and to exclude the potential impacts of these factors on 
technology cost trends. Without thoroughly examining these factors, the applicability of Lovering et. 
al.͛s ĐoŶĐlusioŶs regardiŶg gloďal Đost treŶds is narrower than they purport. 
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Similarly, Lovering et. al. focus on overnight capital cost trends within individual countries, 
without a full analysis across countries with normalized currencies. Major cost trends are only assessed 
in comparison with other reactors in the same country. Yet when seeking to determine cost trends for a 
specific technology, global comparisons are more appropriate (provided material, labor, and other 
factors are already normalized). 
The case of South Korean nuclear power provides a good illustration. Lovering et. al. argue that 
South Korea provides a strong counter example to the picture of escalating overnight capital costs in 
other ĐouŶtries, ŶotiŶg that ͞froŵ the first reaĐtor iŶ Korea iŶ ϭϵϳϭ, Đosts fell ďǇ ϱϬ%͟ for the ŵost 
recent reactors constructed. This analysis relates to a limited sample of only 24-28 reactors,1 yet the 
resulting picture of apparently declining in-country nuclear costs plays a central role in their main 
general conclusions. Beyond this, however, there is a more important issue in this country-level focus. 
Although the authors do not discuss or analyze the differences, they normalize overnight capital 
costs for currency differences across all countries in the samples shown in Figures 12 and 13. Compared 
to the global reactor fleet in these figures, the overnight capital costs of recent South Korean nuclear 
reactors (around $2,000/KW) are still at the high end compared to the prevailing capital costs of 
reaĐtors that ďegaŶ ĐoŶstruĐtioŶ iŶ the ϭϵϳϬ͛s ;arouŶd $ϭ,ϬϬϬ-2,000/KW). This is especially notable as 
the lower normalized priĐes froŵ the ϭϵϳϬ͛s apply to a period when nuclear was beginning 
commercialization, when learning might be expected to begin driving costs down. 
Moreover, Lovering et. al. repeatedly use terms that have the effect of depreciating capital cost 
escalations in some countries as ͚ŵild͛ or ͚ŵilder͛. Yet currency-normalized cost estimates for the U.S., 
                                                          
1 As explained in the next section, there are an inconsistent number of South Korean nuclear reactors in the study. 
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France, West Germany, Canada, India, and South Korea are 1-10 times overnight capital costs during 
initial commercialization (Grubler 2010, Koomey and Hultman 2007).  
Limited comparative novelty  
Another element in our critique of Lovering et al. is that their study is not as novel as claimed, 
with questionable reliability compared to previous work.  TheǇ posit that ͞draǁiŶg aŶǇ stroŶg 
conclusions about future power costs based… [on the U.S. experience] … would be ill advised.͟ They also 
Đlaiŵ that ͞past studies haǀe ďeeŶ liŵited iŶ their sĐope, foĐusiŶg priŵarilǇ oŶ Đost treŶds iŶ the ϭϵϳϬs 
aŶd ϭϵϴϬ for the U“ aŶd FraŶĐe.͟ Yet a series of recent studies led by some of the present authors 
(Sovacool 2014a, 2014b, 2014c) cover reactors beyond France and the US, and look beyond the 1970s 
and 1980s.   
To elaborate, these recent studies address a sample of 180 reactors built from 1969 to 2005 
across 7 countries—Canada, France, India, Japan, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United 
States—worth some $449 billion in investment and 177,591 MWe of capacity.  Although France and the 
US admittedly constitute a large part of this sample, 47 of these reactors were built in other countries.   
This total sample is not as large or as recent as LoǀeriŶg et al.͛s ϯϰϵ reaĐtors. However, it only 
includes data that has been verified in each instance by a publicly available source unlike Lovering et. al. 
We believe this verification confers additional confidence in data quality. For example, the key country 
uŶderlǇiŶg LoǀeriŶg et. al͛s ĐoŶĐlusioŶ that ŶuĐlear does Ŷot haǀe aŶ iŶhereŶt Đost treŶd is “outh Korea. 
The data behind this conclusion are overnight capital costs reported privately by a nuclear power utility. 
Due to the self-reported nature of this data, it is impossible to independently verify  its reliability.  
Similarly, seǀeral iŶĐoŶsisteŶĐies iŶ LoǀeriŶg et. al.͛s artiĐle raise potential concerns about data 
quality for South Korea. Lovering et. al. claim to only include data for completed nuclear facilities. 
However, there are an inconsistent number of South Korean nuclear reactors cited in their study: 
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section 2 says 24, figure 10 appears to show 25, Table 1 says 28, section 3.1.2. says 26, and the appendix 
says 26. As of 2014, there were 24 nuclear reactors in South Korea. Several nuclear reactors have either 
recently been completed or are due for completion in 2016. AĐĐordiŶg to LoǀeriŶg et. al.͛s Đriteria, at 
least some of these reactors should not be included in the study as they were not complete. The South 
Korean nuclear utility likely reported cost estimates for these reactors instead of actual completion 
Đosts. It is uŶĐlear to ǁhat degree this iŶĐoŶsisteŶĐǇ iŵpaĐts LoǀeriŶg et. al.͛s results but it does raise 
concerns about the reliability of self-reported data. 
Comparably, the results from Sovacool 2014 a, b, c, show a different picture than Lovering et. al. 
Although Lovering et. al. do not cite these studies, they are readily accessible, received wide attention 
(ex. Roberts 2014; Shahan 2014; and De Vos 2015), and their underlying data is fully publically available 
in Sovacool et. al. 2014b. Moreover, nuclear reactors formed only one subset of these other studies, 
which compared nuclear overruns with those for hydroelectric dams, thermal plants (a category that 
included natural gas and coal facilities, among others), wind farms, solar energy facilities, and 
transmission networks. We would argue that the data in these studies is more reliable while its broader 
scope provides a better basis for necessarily comparative policy conclusions.   
In addition, and critically, unlike Lovering et. al., Sovacool 2014 a, b, c, include both interest 
rates and normalized currencies. Drawing on a cross-national dataset from Sovacool et al. 2014b, Figure 
1 shows the median nuclear reactor in that sample to have an overrun on a percentage basis of 65%, 
normalizing to 578 $/kWe. The top quartile was particularly extreme, with more than 25% of nuclear 
reactors having overruns above 179% and 1,425 $/kWe.  Moreover, this recent dataset suggests that 
overruns afflicted greater than 97 percent of nuclear projects.  Sixty-four projects in this sample had cost 
overruns exceeding $1 billion, and the single highest overrun had a cost escalation of more than 1200%. 
This picture contrasts strongly with the impression given in Lovering et. al. 
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INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE 
Table 1 (also drawing from Sovacool 2014 a, b, c) shows nuclear power in a comparative 
context. It is an outlier in relation to frequencies and magnitudes of both construction overruns and 
time overruns.  This dataset indicates that nuclear is indeed anomalous when compared for overall 
capital costs over time and incidence and frequency of cost overruns. Recent evidence also indicates 
that capital costs for solar and wind have been declining, independent of changes in commodity, labor, 
and other input costs (Wiser and Bolinger 2015, Bolinger and Seel 2015).   
INSERT TABLE 1 HERE 
Lovering et al. do briefly compare nuclear with other technologies in section 4.4.3. However, they do not 
fully analyse how overnight capital cost increases or cost overruns for nuclear power relate to those of 
other technologies. Drawn from peer-reviewed studies looking at cost overruns across different types of 
infrastructure, Figure 2, for instance, clearly shows that nuclear reactors have the highest mean cost 
escalation (117%), compared to only 71% for hydroelectric dams, 13% for thermal power plants, 8 
percent for wind farms, and 1 percent for solar energy facilities. This comparison is critical, as it is only 
by such means that it can be determined whether nuclear cost escalations are typical or atypical in the 
power sector.   
INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE 
Biased interpretation 
Our final criticism is not entirely specific to Lovering et al., but a more general point concerning 
the tendency for the advocates of any specific form of energy - whether nuclear, renewables, or specific 
fossil fuels - to interpret data selectively whether they are in industry or beyond.  Many analysts on both 
͞sides͟ of the ŶuĐlear deďate soŵetiŵes use their data iŶ a ǁaǇ that suits their purposes.  We have 
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some concerns that Lovering et. al. are selectively interpreting the results of their study in a way not 
justified by the data, particularly in light of the limitations we have discussed. 
Lovering and colleagues have repeatedly referred to their data or analysis publicly as reflecting 
the ͞real Đosts of ŶuĐlear poǁer͟ ;LoǀeriŶg ϮϬϭϱͿ, as offeriŶg a ͞complete construction cost historǇ͟ of 
the iŶdustrǇ ;LoǀeriŶg et al. ϮϬϭϲďͿ, or proǀiŶg that ͞nuclear plants can be built quickly, safely, and 
cheaply͟ ;Nordhaus ϮϬϭϲͿ.  IŶ light of ďoth LoǀeriŶg et. al.͛s aĐtual results and our previous criticisms, 
these characterizations of their study are misleading and inaccurate.  Even within their study there is 
potential selective interpretation – as noted earlier, the authors consistently used qualitative terms like 
͞ŵild͟ or ͞ŵilder͟ iŶ desĐriďiŶg OCC Đost esĐalatioŶ that did Ŷot oďjeĐtiǀelǇ assess ǁhat the data ǁas 
presenting. 
This potentially selective interpretation of data and presentation of results speaks to a larger 
challenge in analyzing nuclear construction costs. Some scholars have even found a long-run pattern of 
selective use by nuclear advocates over the past few decades in a practice known as tactical data 
͚triŵŵiŶg͛ (Shrader-Frechette, 2011) of the full economic costs reactors.  Efforts to trim the 
documented cost of nuclear energy are too numerous to document comprehensively here. Examples 
include: over-estimations of load-factors and lifetimes of reactors; grave underestimations of 
construction times; and assumptions of economies of scale in vast reactor programs that never 
eventuate [eg: (Spangler, 1983)(Ramana, 2009)(Thomas, 2010b)(Gross et al., 2013)(Keepin & Wynne, 
1984)]. Other instances involve discounting for future waste costs externalized to utilities and 
consumers (Jackson, 2008); insufficient attention to potentially significant on-site engineering costs in 
overall cost estimates; and claims that designs of new reactors are complete when in fact they require 
expensive alteration and development during the construction process which raises costs (Thomas, 
2010).  
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Liability and insurance are another key factor in evaluating the comparative costs of nuclear 
power – with many arguing that published figures fail to represent the full costs of nuclear power 
(Pearce, 2012; Verbruggen, Laes, & Lemmens, 2014). Though differing between jurisdictions, de facto or 
de jure caps are ubiquitous on the total amount of insurance cover applicable, such as to address only a 
fraction of the total cost of a severe nuclear accident. The neglect of this factor alone constitutes a 
͞hiddeŶ suďsidǇ͟ to nuclear power, since it is the public that would pay the balance of costs in the event 
of an accident (Eeckhoudt, Schieber, & Schneider, 2000). It is remarkable that this factor remains so 
neglected, despite major utilities admitting that full liability insurance would make nuclear power 
commercially unviable (Schrader-Frechette, 2012).   
Yet another often-underpriced attribute of nuclear power performance is the persistent 
economic cost of accidents and incidents when they do occur.  Wheatly et al. (2016a, 2016b) have 
published recent statistical analyses of 216 nuclear energy accidents and incidents around the world 
over the past seven decades.  Catastrophic accidents can be extremely expensive, with Chernobyl 
estimated to have cost $259 billion and Fukushima $166 billion, with most of those costs borne by the 
public.  Wheatly et al. also estimated that such costs will continue into the future.  They calculated 
incident and accident rates for 2014 at a conservative range of 0.0025-0.0035, or 1-1.4 events per year 
over the entire nuclear fleet.   They also noted that when a nuclear event of at least $20 million in 
damage occurs, the probability that it transforms into a catastrophe with damage larger than one billion 
dollars is almost ten percent.  Under the status quo, they projected at least one Fukushima-scale 
accident (or larger) accident with 50% probability every 60-150 years. This inherent financial risk of 
nuclear power is almost never fully monetized.   
In addition, the typically higher levels of government involvement often make state secrecy an 
issue in the documenting of nuclear economics – for example in the UK (Massey, 1988). Here, there is 
widespread disquiet at persistent secrecy in provision of key information concerning nuclear economics 
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provided to the European Commission for evaluating the granting of state aid (Leftly, 2015). There are 
also oŶgoiŶg ĐoŶĐerŶs aďout the reliaďilitǇ of iŶforŵatioŶ oŶ ChiŶa͛s ŶuĐlear Ŷeǁ ďuild prograŵ (Yi-
Chong, n.d.).  Lastly, content analyses have documented that even International Atomic Energy Agency 
technical reports and international ŶuĐlear phǇsiĐs artiĐles relǇ oŶ a proĐess of ͟seleĐtiǀe reŵeŵďraŶĐe͟ 
where unfavorable data, especially historical data, are consistently and at times comprehensively 
ignored (Sovacool & Ramana 2015). 
It is in all these ways and many more that nuclear costs are the subject of unusual levels of 
obscurity – and opportunities for bias.  LoǀeriŶg et al. therefore iŶ Ŷo ǁaǇ proǀide a ͞Đoŵplete͟ or 
͞real͟ piĐture of ŶuĐlear Đosts.   
Conclusion  
In conclusion, several methodological decisions limit the applicability of LoǀeriŶg et. al͛s aŶalǇsis 
to overall nuclear construction costs. Difficulties concerning the impact of interest costs on total 
installed costs, the role of cost overruns, accounting for independent cost variables, the normalizing of 
global data, and comparisons with existing energy sources all serve to blunt  LoǀeriŶg et. al͛s iŵplied 
critique of earlier studies. Indeed, several conclusions in the existing literature remain unrefuted: 
 Nuclear energy displays serious cost escalations both in the form of rising capital costs over 
time and in cost overruns at individual plants; 
 There are regional and temporal variations in these trends, but similar patterns nonetheless 
persist across countries and timeframes; 
 Compared to other technologies, the intensity of these cost escalations is highly distinctive of 
nuclear reactors; 
 Policymakers and energy modelers addressing nuclear energy need to be aware of elevated 
capital costs, the critical role of interest rates, and the near certainty of cost and time overruns. 
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In many ways, the effect of Lovering et al͛s analysis is to further cloud the waters rather than clear them.     
Nevertheless, LoǀeriŶg et. al.͛s dataset does proǀide a ĐoŶtriďutioŶ to the aǀailaďle literature on 
overnight construction costs. While we believe it does not justify the extent of their conclusions and we 
have some data quality concerns, additional data (if properly interpreted and limitations recognized) can 
only improve collective understanding of nuclear cost issues. Therefore, we call on Lovering and 
colleagues to publically release their dataset and supporting information to the degree possible. It 
would be interesting to see what happens when one adds interest and normalized currencies to their 
data, or integrates their dataset with others such as ours.  A more established platform of transparent 
and accessible data can refine our knowledge of the drivers and dynamics of construction risks for 
power plants. 
Further, Lovering et al.͛s aŶalǇsis does illustrate the need for future research and greatly 
improved data collection and availability. In undertaking our earlier analyses (Sovacool et. al., 2014 
a,b,c), some of the present authors repeatedly encountered data quality issues with existing articles, 
archives, and internet resources. Only a relatively small sample of accurate and reliable construction 
data is available for energy systems. With most data concentrated in Europe or North America, this is 
highly geographically incomplete. We therefore encourage major energy institutions such as the 
International Energy Agency, U.S. Energy Information Administration, Nuclear Energy Agency, 
International Atomic Energy Agency, and the International Renewable Energy Agency to formalize the 
reporting and verification of basic energy construction data.   
Lastly, although we have concerns about the methodology, novelty, and balance of Lovering et 
al.͛s studǇ, ǁe do appreĐiate the increased visibility their piece brings to the topic of cost escalation and 
overruns.  Like them, we have a desire to properly contextualize this key aspect of nuclear performance. 
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With so much at stake, everybody has a shared interest – like Sherlock Holmes in our epigram – in 
avoiding misrepresentations of all kinds.  
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